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I face three distinguished members of the Clinton administration --- the USTR 
Charlene Barshefsky, the White House adviser on trade to the President, Lael Brainard, 
and the author, Robert Lawrence, who also served as a member of the Council of 
Economic Advisers. They will proclaim the administration’s success with trade policy, 
whereas I hold the diametrically opposed and published view that the administration’s 
trade policy left much to be desired, and in key respects was a disaster.1 I feel therefore 
very much like Gary Cooper in High Noon. But let me assure the Chair that, unlike Garry 
Cooper, I shall not turn in my badge and ride my buggy away from the scene even if I 
win. I have every intention of staying on, fighting the good fight for a better trade policy, 
for one’s task is never done if one is a free trader, and a multilateral one to boot, as I 
happen to be.  
I must compliment Lawrence on a characteristically splendid paper. It is a bird’s 
eye view of virtually the entire trade policy scene and every reader will profit from 
reading it.  The bird is, however, the American eagle and, despite the author’s 
cosmopolitan temperament and record, I shall argue that the evaluation of Washington’s 
trade policy under the Clinton administration is a trifle, even excessively, indulgent.  
But, ignoring the inevitable disagreements on details that a paper of such scope 
entails, let me raise at the outset three general issues about the Clinton hagiography. First, 
Lawrence talks at times, and so do most former officials of the administration, of Clinton 
“believing” this or that. I am not privy to the former President’s beliefs; and I doubt if 
these officials are either. Indeed, at the beginning of his first term, many of us were 
doubtful about President Clinton’s commitment to free trade; and I said mischievously at 
a Washington meeting that, while the problem with President Bush, his predecessor, was 
that one could not read his lips, the problem with President Clinton was deeper: one did 
not know whether to read his upper lip or his lower lip.  But, whatever the truth of the 
matter, we cannot go even by his speeches. After all, with American politicians, we know 
that others write their speeches, a practice that we deplore even in the weaker version 
such as the notorious Millie Vinelli episode, and which we academics cannot emulate: I 
have never succeeded in getting an Assistant Professor to write my article for me, leave 
aside hogging the credit for his work instead.  
Second, since Lawrence addresses the 1990s and the Clinton administration 
record, more or less as if the two were the same, let me say that the Clinton 
administration did not start until 1993. More important, we have a problem that afflicts 
every assessment of an administration’s record: initiatives and work that began under 
earlier ones will cross over into the one we are assessing, and initiatives begun under the 
latter will likely bear fruit in the succeeding administrations. In the case of the Clinton 
administration, it can be fairly said that the Uruguay Round was begun earlier and was 
close to completion when the Clinton folks came in: they simply completed it, standing 
on the shoulders of their predecessors and grasping the prize. I do not deny that they had 
to work very hard to do so, balancing themselves precariously and reaching out at the 
definite risk of falling off these shoulders. The Clinton administration deserves some 
credit for sure, but the toast must be drunk to its predecessors on this one. 
But both good and bad things were inherited. Thus, the discredit (in my view) for 
having gone after NAFTA --- which, as I argue below, has had important adverse effects 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 I have argued this thesis in my latest collection of public policy essays, The Wind of the Hundred Days: 
How Washington Mismanaged Globalization, MIT Press:Cambridge, 2001. 
on multilateralism --- belongs also to the previous administration, and especially to 
Messrs. James Baker and Robert Zoellick, who were and are energetic proponents of not 
just NAFTA but also of the bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements that now disfigure 
the world trading scene and to which Mr. Zoellick now plans to devote his new duties. 
[Of course, despite all this, there are some defining and huge events (such as the Seattle 
debacle at the WTO Ministerial), and almost completed but minor initiatives (such as the 
PTA with Jordan) that are virtually entirely to be attributed to the Clinton administration; 
but more on this below.] 
Third, Lawrence should not suggest, however fleetingly, that the critics of the 
Clinton trade policies and performance are either far out on the right (like Pat Buchanan) 
or on the extreme left (like Ralph Nader) and that the “pure free traders”,2 whatever that 
means, such as myself are also somehow on the “right” and that they belong to either the 
American Enterprise Institute or the Cato Institute. As it happens, I am a Democrat 
myself, and my affiliations are multiple and have extended also in varying ways to 
Brookings, Council on Foreign Relations, the United Nations, the GATT, the WTO, 
Human Rights Watch, and on and on. I have the certain knowledge that this is true also of 
many trade economists who have misgivings about the Clinton administration record. 
Also, whenever I have organized petitions on trade issues faced by the Clinton 
administration (and its predecessor as well since I am an Equal Opportunity critic of bad 
policies), the signatories have included numerous Democrats who have been unhappy 
with Washington.  
                                                          
2 I am not sure that Nader could be described as being on the extreme left. He is totally misguided on trade 
policy, but his views on the need for countervailing corporate power are shared widely and were reflected 
even in the Gore campaign’s central themes. 
Indeed, this is important to remember also since many defenders of the Clinton 
administration’s failings in trade policy come back by saying that Reagan or Bush did 
worse. Maybe. But perhaps things were worse in the Garden of Eden too: if, in lieu of 
autarky, the wretched apple had only been traded for something more innocuous, Adam 
and Eve would have continued in bliss. It is better to measure each administration against 
itself, its challenges and whether it met them, its potential and whether it rose to it. In 
short, at least in the reflective atmosphere of the academe, we ought to be able to avoid 
making our analysis captive to a partisan spirit, difficult as this is. 
But let me now get down to real business. The administration’s success could be 
judged by reference to two broad, and generally distinct, criteria:  
• Criterion 1: How much did trade expand; how many trade agreements were 
signed; etc.: an approach that dominates certainly Ambassador Barshefsky’s 
comments and is present also in Lawrence’s paper at various points; and 
• Criterion 2: Did the administration affect the atmospherics of trade, and the 
architecture of the world trading system, in the right way? 
 
Criterion 1: Yes, indeed, Lawrence is right to argue that, by the criterion of trade 
expansion, the Clinton record is pretty good. But, since Lawrence implies (and Ms. 
Barshefsky has also suggested in her comments) that this was courtesy of Washington’s 
policies, and particularly because of the numerous trade agreements signed under Ms. 
Barshefsy’s watch, let me make a few important qualifiers. 
We must recognize that trade has grown rapidly, even as a proportion of GNP, 
worldwide and for some time going back way before the 1990s.  We therefore need to 
take the partial derivative here. How much did these agreements add to what would have 
happened anyway?  
Thus, for example, service trade has been growing phenomenally even prior to the 
Uruguay Round’s GATS agreement whose aim is not just to open markets further but to 
introduce some discipline and rules in this trade, these latter objectives translating more 
into better quality rather than into increased quantity of trade flows. 
Again, much of the expansion reflects, not any agreements to liberalize trade, but 
also a great amount of unilateral trade liberalization worldwide that has had little to do 
with agreements or even aid conditionality.3 It is hard to say whether this accelerated in 
the 1990s but in areas such as South America, Central Europe and India, there is indeed 
evidence that it did. 
Moreover, Lawrence tends to attribute more to the Preferential Trade Agreements 
than is legitimate. Our PTAs with Chile and Singapore are, of course, still not negotiated, 
whereas Jordan is not yet approved. But the former two represent agreements with 
countries that have unilaterally liberalized their trade. They seek PTAs with us because 
they face trade diversion against them from our preferential policies, leaving aside 
political reasons. So, the bottom line is: they have already opened their markets and are 
happy to finish their job unilaterally, whereas it is we who are indulging in preferential 
agreements to bring them into the PTA fold with us! It makes no sense for us to take 
credit for such a situation by suggesting that we are “opening the markets of the world” 
through these PTA agreements. 
                                                          
3 I recently directed a project on the subject of unilateral trade liberalization. The volume resulting from it 
is being published shortly. Cf. Jagdish Bhagwati (ed.), Going Alone: The Case for Relaxed Reciprocity in 
Freeing Trade, MIT Press: Cambridge, Spring 2002. 
In this vein, I should also remind Lawrence, who surely knows this well, that all 
agreements should not be lumped together with equal weights. I can understand 
Ms.Barshefsky, who is a lawyer, claiming that she has signed nearly 300 trade 
agreements. So did USTR Mickey Kantor, of course. To a trade negotiator, perhaps every 
agreement is another feather in her cap. But these agreements surely include several 
sectoral trade-restricting agreements, such as those under the MFA I guess. Are trade-
restricting agreements to be equated with trade-liberalizing ones? And, even among the 
trade-liberalizing ones, is a piffling US-Jordan FTA of the same value as the Uruguay 
Round? And, is a failure such as Seattle, to be balanced off against the success of a 
sectoral agreement, however large in scope? 
 
Criterion 2: 
 But, even if all these qualifiers and nuances were reflected in the assessment, the 
verdict on the Clinton years would be woefully incomplete and misleading. The real 
problem with the Clinton administration was that it contributed adversely to the 
atmospherics of trade policy, and hence undermined unwittingly but surely the 
architecture of the multilateral world trading system. Consider just a few important 
points. 
(1) It can fairly be said that the Clinton administration elevated allegations of 
 “unfairness” into a major problem in dealing with trade openness and liberalization. 
President Clinton came into office, with Japan-baiting and Japan-obsession at center 
stage. Charges of Japan’s unfair trade practices were the hallmark of the administration. 
Revival of Super 301 was right inside the party document, Putting People First. The 
infamous US-Japan auto dispute, which (contrary to Lawrence’s approbation) 4 turned 
into a fiasco for the administration, both reflected the obsession with unfair trade and 
contributed to its exacerbation. 
(2) Taking NAFTA through the Congress for a successful outcome was, from the 
 viewpoint of the increasing encroachment of  “fair trade” notions, another turning point. 
Protectionists who feared free trade with Mexico, and these included labor unions that 
feared a decline in their worker’s real wages and loss of jobs across the Rio Grande, 
could zero in on the warts on Mexico’s face and turn them into “fair trade” issues. This 
was true of Mexico’s labor and environmental state and standards, for sure: the 
protectionists claimed that free trade with Mexico was unfair trade by Mexico unless 
labor and environmental restrictions were put into the NAFTA treaty. This was not the 
case with the Uruguay Round where the multiplicity of nations precluded zeroing in on 
one country’s non-trade situation. Thus, in debates that I had with anti-trade activists over 
NAFTA, I was often told: you can have the Uruguay Round but NAFTA we will give 
you only over your dead body. NAFTA helped make credible the notion that non-trade 
issues, with persistent lobbying,  could be made into “fair trade” preconditions for trade 
liberalization.  
The US has had to live with the consequences ever since: the failure to secure fast 
track, the Seattle debacle, the present impasse over the Trade Promotion Authority have 
their origins, to a large extent, in the NAFTA debate and outcome. Was NAFTA worth it 
all? I doubt it, leaving aside also the fact that it has pushed the US still further and 
                                                          
4 Cf. My detailed analysis of the dispute and how the USTR had declared victory but was only masking 
defeat, is in an essay published in International Affairs, and reprinted in my public policy essays, A Stream 
of Windows: Unsettled Reflections on Trade, Immigration and Democracy, MIT Press:Cambridge, 1998. 
decisively into the embrace of a trade policy of proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral 
PTAs which I believe to be a mistake. 
In fact, the cancer of “fair trade” has spread so deeply into the American body 
politic by now, and the Clinton administration must take its share of blame for it5, that 
even the present President Bush, who had studiously avoided the invocation of fair trade 
when endorsing free trade, succumbed to it in announcing his 201 action against foreign 
steel. This is a safeguard action (which has nothing to with whether the market-disruption 
is due to unfair or fair trade) but the administration announced it while claiming that 
foreign nations were “unfairly” exporting steel to us.6 The action was bad enough from 
the viewpoint of free trade in steel; but the language of unfair trade made it far worse in 
stroking the monster that the previous administration had fed and raised.  
(3) The Clinton administration also fed the virus of unfair trade by a frequent 
 resort to Section 301 which, of course, relies for the most part heavily on the notion of 
unfair trade by others. President Bush had reluctantly signed on to the 1988 Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act which had made this a more deadly instrument; but 
remember that President Clinton’s administration was more enthusiastic, in light of the 
Japan-obsession with which it came into office.  
The Panelists today suggest that the Clinton administration sheathed this nasty 
                                                          
5 My position is only that the Clinton administration gave this cancer an immense boost. I had actually 
talked about this cancer, and its spread, and raised an alarm over it in my 1990 Harry Johnson Lecture in 
London, published later as The World Trading System at Risk, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1991. 
6 This misled even our “newspaper of record”, the New York Times, into editorializing as if this was an 
anti-dumping action! Our trade policy coverage in the best newspapers can border on the abysmal, unlike 
that in the “foreign legion”  represented by The Financial Times and The Economist. 
 sword. But surely, only after the high-profile US-Japan auto dispute debacle and the 
massive criticisms abroad,7 and in the end only when the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel 
in 1999 virtually made its use de facto WTO-illegal, while giving us a face-saving victory 
and the EU the real victory, that we can claim that this sword was finally sheathed. 
(4) That brings me to the Seattle debacle. That outweighs any success that the 
 Clinton administration may claim. It was a direct blow to the multilateral system and has 
also served to accelerate the shift to bilaterals in Asia.  (a region which had been 
generally free from this affliction). 
 Was it something that could be blamed on Mike Moore (as many in Washington 
would like to believe) or on the disorder in the streets that came (presumably 
exogenously to our actions and inactions) from the foes of free trade and of the WTO? 
Some have even argued that the problem was that the conference hall was not available 
over the weekend to complete negotiations that were “close to completion” because the 
optometrists had booked it for their convention: apparently if we had only consulted them 
and restored our 20/20 vision, we could have kept the hall away from them and for our 
glorious purpose. 
 I will only briefly assert, what I and others have argued at length elsewhere, that 
Washington gets the lion’s share of the blame. There was little effective preparation for 
Seattle, to secure the kind of negotiating text with which we could operate at the speed 
necessary. Washington had also disregarded the obvious signs of impending disorder, 
                                                          
7 I remember Arthur Dunkel, then Director General of GATT, whom I was Economic Policy Adviser to in 
1991-1993, telling me that nothing had unified the GATT members as much as their opposition to the 301 
legislation and actions of the United States. For a proper assessment of 301 legislation, we must remember 
however that one part of it dealt with enforcement of existing obligations and another with creating new 
ones; it was the latter that created the resentments, not the former (when it followed favorable GATT 
Dispute Settlement Panel findings which were blocked from being adopted by the GATT Council). See, in 
making no preparation for the chaos that followed. Reliance on Seattle authorities to 
manage the meeting without significant federal input was surely a mistake as well. I have 
returned to Seattle several times after the debacle, to debate anti-trade activists; and I 
must say that Seattle is an ultra-liberal city that makes even Massachusetts seem 
conservative!  And then President Clinton’s gaffe over trade sanctions for labor issues 
was critical; whatever his reasons for this --- I myself do not think it was unwitting and 
believe that it was calculated ---, it did finally kill the Seattle Round.  
(5) This brings me to other ways in which the Clinton administration appears to 
 have failed us. With Seattle goofed up, the effect was to create the notion that the NGOs 
and the unions had “won the battle of Seattle”. President Clinton did not confront the 
street violence and demonstrators in the clear tone of condemnation that Prime Minister 
Tony Blair has firmly deployed, calling them “louts”. He was instead accommodating 
and indulgent. As for the unions’ fears of free trade and their inappropriate demands to 
amend the WTO to apply trade sanctions to countries and their products apropos of lapses 
from a Social Clause, he did not forcefully refute these fears and demands.  
Recall that the turning point in the NAFTA debate came with Al Gore’s success 
in the debate with Ross Perot. We needed a debate where Clinton would slay John 
Sweeney: but we never got it. Nor did we get a direct attack on Mr. Sweeney’s fears and 
demands from the White House. Nor were there any new creative initiatives at ILO and 
other agencies where social and environmental issues could be pursued without the use of 
trade sanctions nor any systematic argumentation about the relative demerits of a WTO-
                                                                                                                                                                             
this regard, the papers by me and Robert Hudec in Bhagwati and Patrick, Aggressive Unilateralism, 1990, 
op.cit. 
based, trade-sanctions-using approach.  In short, President Clinton at Seattle got what he 
deserved, but not what we deserved. 
(6) Finally, let me say that while, under Clinton administration’s watch, there 
 have been important sectoral liberalization agreements, this must be set against the fact 
that these agreements take the affected business groups out of the multilateral arena. If 
you have already gotten your liberalization through sectoral agreements, why waste time 
and lobbying resources for the new Round? Hence, the politics of getting multilateralism 
going becomes more difficult. This is in contrast to the sectoral trade-restricting 
agreements such as the MFA in the past: they took the difficult sectors out of the 
negotiations and enabled multilateralism to flourish instead! 
 This is equally true of the bilateral and plurilateral PTAs. If you invest in getting 
NAFTA, you (in exporting business) get the benefits of your lobbying efforts all to 
yourself since NAFTA is a PTA. But if you invest in the Uruguay Round or a new Qatar 
Round, the liberalization that follows would be on an MFN basis: other “free riders” 
benefit too.  
Then again, if you have negotiated a special preferential benefit for yourself, you 
have no real interest in pursuing it for all at Geneva. This is seen in the fact that, in the 
latest anti-dumping dispute where several countries have joined as plaintiffs against the 
US, Canada and Mexico did not join but are now likely to because they have discovered 
that they too can be charged with dumping. 
So, getting support for multilateral efforts on trade liberalization gets more 
difficult. Interest in the WTO then wanes. Though Lester Thurow was wrong in declaring 
the GATT was dead, we must then begin to worry about the WTO beginning to suffer 
from neglect, even atrophy though not a certain death. Meanwhile, the world trading 
system would see a continuing proliferation of bilaterals, which Ambassadors Kantor and 
Barshefsky may celebrate as feathers in their cap, but which are rapidly creating a maze 
of preferences that I have called a “spaghetti bowl” and which are a blight on the world 
trading system. Let my last vignette for Lawrence be that the EU, the chief sinner in this 
regard, now has only 5 countries enjoying MFN tariff access to it, with all others 
enjoying some special preference or the other. So, the MFN tariff has now become the 
LFN tariff: it applies to the least favored countries! And so our cynicism, and not just our 
distress, multiplies. 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
